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C O M M E N TA R Y

Legislative Amendment of Citizen
Initiatives:

to change a directly democratic act of the
people. Such considerations when
earnestly applied can serve to balance the
legislature’s representational duty to mind
the popular will as well as its leadership
responsibility to steward the state with
the additional exercise of the legislature’s
own lawmaking power.

Where the “Will of the Voter” Meets the
“Consent of the Elector”
by Derek P. Langhauser
INTRODUCTION

M

aine continues to experience relatively frequent use of citizens’
initiatives.1 These initiatives have legislated issues attracting broad attention
such as school funding, recreational
marijuana, minimum wage, transmission lines, ranked-choice voting, and
Medicaid expansion, to name just a few.
This frequent activity sparks several
questions. Are such initiatives perceived
necessary because elected representatives
are not being responsive enough? Should
the threshold for gathering signatures be
raised to make the process more difficult
to initiate? Should the people be able to
initiate laws in areas that are both complex
and implicate the legislature’s express core
powers, such as taxation, spending,
education, and general welfare? Should
the legislature send out more competing
measures?
Yet other questions recur when the
legislature amends what the people have
passed. Does the legislature’s amendment
or repeal of such measures not long after
the people approve them inappropriately
trespass upon the will of the voters? How
much deference, if any, has or should the
legislature accord initiatives? In the
future, if initiatives that propose substantive movement on important or otherwise populist issues succeed, the demand
on the legislature to revisit those
60

LEGISLATURE-AMENDED
INITIATED LAWS

initiatives may increase, so, too, may
these questions of whether the legislature
can and should respond and, if yes, how
far the responses should go.
Recognition of possible legislative
amendment or repeal may be disquieting
to those who support initiatives, believe
strongly in the merits of direct democracy, and support passionately the carefully chosen text of their specific measure.
All advocates in the political process work
hard for their wins and none appreciates
having their wins meaningfully altered,
effectively diluted, or worse yet, outright
repealed. But advocates and those citizens
who are asked to sign a petition, give
money, or vote at the polls should recall
that, as a matter of fundamental Maine
constitutional law, citizen-initiated and
-approved legislation is like any other
statute and is therefore subject to amendment or repeal at any time.
The purpose of this article is to
discuss these issues by explaining the
legislature’s authority to amend or repeal
citizen initiatives, how and why the
Maine Constitution specifically provides
for that authority, and how and why that
approach is conceptually consistent with
numerous other provisions and principles
of our Constitution. This article further
suggests the types of issues that, regardless
of the subject matter in question, the
legislature should consider in determining whether, and if so how and when,

M

aine is one of 23 states that
authorize the people to initiate
new, amended, or repealed statutes. By
comparison, 12 of those states provide for
direct initiatives (proposals that qualify
go directly on the ballot); nine, like
Maine, provide for indirect initiatives
(proposals are submitted to the legislature, which has an opportunity to act
on the proposed legislation, and the
initiative question goes on the ballot
if the legislature rejects it, submits a
different proposal, or takes no action);
and two provide for both direct and indirect initiatives.2
Maine’s history of permitting initiatives is more than 100 years old. The
initiative provision of the Maine
Constitution was enacted in 1909 and
first used in 1911.3 Thereafter, and for the
first six decades, only seven initiatives
received a popular vote. It was not until
1970 that initiatives began to appear on
ballots more frequently.4
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court
and the Maine attorney general5 have
both recognized that the legislature has
the power to repeal or amend an initiated
or referred law and that the legislature
may do so either expressly or by implication. All told, from 1909 to the date of
this publication, there have been 78 initiatives.6 Seven were approved by the legislature and consequently never went to
referenda. That is the rare path. Although
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legislative review and disapproval of
initiatives is a constitutional prerequisite
to a popular vote, such disapproval is not
a reflection of the chambers’ views on the
merits. The legislature typically votes to
send initiatives to the people not as any
statement on the merits but simply so
that citizens may have their say.
That leaves 71 that went to referenda
(nine of those with competing measures),
and 36 failed and 35 were approved. Of
the 35 that were approved, 29 were
amended at least once by the legislature.
Of those 29, 21 were amended either at
the next session of the same term or the
next legislative term, and eight were
amended or repealed years later. So, over
the full history of the provision, the
Maine Legislature has amended or
repealed popularly approved initiatives
about 83 percent of the time.
Depending on one’s perspective,
many of these changes may be regarded as
technical in nature. As such, they did not
attract attention or debate. Others though
have been more substantive, such as the
amendment in 2005 immediately after
voters approved an initiated change to the
state’s funding formula for general
purpose aid to K–12 education.7 This was
done expressly to temper the popular will
with an acknowledgment of fiscal reality.
THE SHARED POWER OF
LAWMAKING: THE PEOPLE
AND LEGISLATURE

T

he Maine Constitution delegates
lawmaking powers to the people
and the legislature alike. Under the
Constitution, the people are the sovereign source of the state. They have the
express rights to “give instructions to
their representatives,” and to request by
“petition or remonstrance redress of their
wrongs and grievances.” They also have
an “unalienable and indefeasible right

to institute government, and to alter,
reform, or totally change the [government] when their safety and happiness
require it.” They “reserve to themselves
power to propose laws and to enact or
reject the same at the polls independent
of the Legislature” (i.e., initiative), and
also “reserve power at their own option
to approve or reject at the polls any
Act, bill, resolve or resolution passed by
the joint action of both branches of the
Legislature” (i.e., referendum).8
The people’s lawmaking powers are
in addition to, and not in replacement of,
the lawmaking powers of the legislature.
The legislature may use its own powers to
propose, enact, and override vetoes of
legislation at their own will, even if it is
on the same subject as that addressed by
the people.9 For its part, the legislature is
not bound by a previous legislature’s
determinations and cannot bind a
successor legislature10 because each legislature retains plenary lawmaking
authority during its biennial term.
THE LEGISLATURE’S CORE
LAWMAKING POWERS

I

n addition to these core legislative
operating principles, the Maine
Constitution speaks expressly to four core
powers of the legislature. Increasingly,
citizen initiatives address subjects within
the scope of these powers.
The first category is the police
power. Under the broad police power,
the governor may propose and pass any
law that the governor “may deem expedient,” and the legislature may propose
any law deemed “reasonable…for the
defense and benefit of People…[and] not
repugnant to the Constitution(s).” This
broad police power is the legislature’s
core duty and responsibility and therefore cannot be bargained or granted
away.11
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Next are the taxation powers.
Because taxation fundamentally burdens
the citizens, the Constitution provides
that no tax may “be imposed without the
consent of the people or of their representatives in the Legislature.” Because taxes
are also the essential source of government revenues, the Constitution also
expressly states that the legislature “shall
never, in any manner, suspend or
surrender the power of taxation.”12 This
means that the legislature is not, and
cannot be, required to defer to a citizens’
initiative involving taxes because such
requirement would constitute a suspension or surrender of that power.
Third is the education power. The
Constitution expressly provides that the
legislature is “authorized, and it shall be
their duty to require, the several towns to
make suitable provision, at their own
expense, for the support and maintenance of public schools.” The legislature
also has the power to “provide that taxes,
which it may authorize a School
Administrative District or a community
school district to levy, may be assessed on
real, personal and intangible property in
accordance with any cost-sharing formula
which it may authorize.” The Constitution
expressly provides these powers to the
legislature because it recognizes that a
“general diffusion of the advantages of
education…[is] essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the
people.” The Constitution entrusts these
powers to the Legislature in order to
“promote this important object.”13
Finally, there is the spending power.
The Constitution expressly provides that
“no money shall be drawn without an
appropriation or allocation authorized by
law.” Although the people may use an
initiative for revenue legislation, when an
initiative proposes to raise or spend
significant amounts of money, such
initiative implicates more substantially
61
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the Legislature’s responsibilities to enact a
balanced biennial budget. The biennial
budget is at the core of a legislature’s
work; it is the measure that most comprehensively provides for the “defense and
benefit of the People” under the police
power clause and directly advances the
“public peace, health and safety” under
the emergency enactment clause.14
PARALLEL, RECIPROCAL, AND
DYNAMIC LAWMAKING POWERS

T

he legislature and people share the
same power: the power to enact.
And what they each have the power
to enact is also the same: a statute,
a form of law that is always capable
of amendment by subsequent action of
the people, the legislature, or both. The
powers of the legislature and people to
enact are parallel; neither is superior to
the other or absolute. Consistent with the
Constitution’s broader scheme of separation of powers and its core mediating
tension of checks and balances, the legislature and people each have the power to
change the acts of the other.
The relationship between these
parallel powers is, by design of the
Constitution, reciprocal and dynamic:
reciprocal because voters can change a
law enacted by the legislature, and the
legislature can change a law approved by
the voters; and dynamic because such
changes can occur whenever, and however
often, either the people or the legislature
has the will and the votes to do so.
The Constitution intentionally does
not confer greater legal status to an initiated enactor over a legislated enactor. To
do so would grant supremacy to direct
democracy over the principles of representative democracy that define the
Maine Constitution. Such supremacy
could ultimately hold the state captive to
the initiative process, and the text and
62

design of our Constitution make clear
that the Framers understood and rejected
that approach. Instead, the Constitution
gives voters the right to govern directly
but only as checked by possible subsequent legislative action. If citizens object
to that change, they can elect other representatives or initiate other legislation.
That dynamic will inevitably cause
tension between the people and their
representatives, but that is exactly how
checks and balances work within the
shared lawmaking powers of an engaged
citizenry and a conscientious legislature.
In short, an initiative is but one step
in the dynamic process of lawmaking: a
process that never ends, that moves from
session to session in a continuous government elected to act in biennial periods of
time,15 that encourages and tolerates
ongoing debates, and accepts disparate
and even conflicting outcomes at
different times along the way.
QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN INITIATIVE AND
LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES

T

he Constitution sets forth only broad
procedures by which an initiative
and legislation are enacted. The initiative process is defined by articulating
a succinct question, getting a certain
number of supportive signatures, giving
the legislature the opportunity to accept
or reject the measure either outright or
by a competing measure),16 and then
holding statewide election. As a practical
matter, the legislature has rarely enacted
the initiative as is (only 7 times in 78
opportunities), rarely proposed its own
competing measures (only 9 times in
78 opportunities), and instead, typically
votes against the measure as is. Citizens
are principally advised of the measure
through the advocacy of proponents and
opponents.

By contrast, the legislative process of
policy formulation occurs within a much
more structured framework. This process
begins with drafting assisted by expert
staff. It then requires an initial review by
a subject-focused committee. After
committee hearings, work sessions, and
debate, amendments are typically devised.
Unanimous or divided reports then go to
the floors of both Houses where further
debate, floor amendments, and conference committees work to achieve the
bicameral concurrence required by the
Constitution. The measure then goes to
the governor who may, among other
choices, line-item veto the measure or
permit the legislature to recall it beforehand;17 either way, giving the measure
even more opportunity for refinement.
This process of legislative enactment—whatever else its flaws—generates
more objective fact finding, clearer issue
identification, and broader attention to
unintended consequences than populist
advocacy. As a result, this process, again
whatever its own shortcomings, typically
admits fewer threats of issue isolation and
issue distortion by special interests.
RECOGNITION OF—AND
CONSTRAINTS TO—THE
WILL OF THE PEOPLE

A

s noted in the introduction, one
important question is whether
the legislature’s amendment or repeal
of such measures not long after the
people approve them inappropriately
trespasses upon the will of the voters.
Under the Maine Constitution, the will
of the people is recognized in six primary
ways: granting consent to first establish the Maine Constitution; approving
subsequent amendments to the Maine
Constitution; voting for the governor,
senators, and representatives; proposing
and voting on citizens’ initiatives; voting
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on policy referenda; and voting on bond
referenda.18
By forming and maintaining the
Constitution, the people consented to its
limitations on their own acts of direct
democracy. By voting on referenda, citizens get their say on legislation but only
within the broader context of the
Constitution, which grants the legislature
a plenary police power to enact laws, a
power that includes the authority to
amend or repeal an initiated law. And by
electing representatives, citizens delegate
broad authority to their representatives to
think for themselves and act on the
people’s behalf. Indeed, a vote for office
authorizes the representative to vote for
or against a myriad of bills, nominees,
resolutions, orders, or sentiments during
their elected term. The only stated limit on
the representatives’ judgment is their
commitment to their oaths of office to
faithfully discharge their duties and
support the state and federal
constitutions.19
The people’s consent to a constitutional scheme of government also means
that their acts of direct democracy are
subject to the doctrine of checks and
balances. This doctrine distributes power
among the three branches of government20 and the people’s interaction with
those branches. This distribution includes
a significant number of limitations on the
people. As already discussed, the legislature retains plenary power to change an
initiated law, and the governor can join
the effort by recommending measures the
governor deems expedient.21 But there
are many more ways—indeed, at least
20—in which our Constitution, with the
people’s consent, restrains the people.
For example, the people cannot
initiate a constitutional amendment,
bond issue, a measure that is not legislative in character, a measure that de facto
amends the United States Constitution or

a measure that suspends rather than
repeals a law, and cannot enforce an
approved measure found to violate the
Constitution. The people cannot recall a
governor, senator, or representative, and
cannot convene the legislature into
session. The Constitution does not permit
the legislature to surrender to the people
its police or taxation powers.
Supermajority two-thirds votes are
required for a variety of actions, even
when a simple majority can be argued to
be more reflective of the people’s will.
These votes include, for example, actions
related to emergency measures, impeachment, veto overrides, confirmation procedures, and removing a disabled governor.
They also include certain matters
regarding bond issues, mining, state
mandates, and state parks.22
Similarly, the House and Senate are
authorized to disqualify, punish, and
expel a member elected by the people.
The legislature controls the power of
impeachment, and the legislature and
Maine Supreme Court chief justice
decide gubernatorial disability. And, of
course, the courts can render and enforce
decisions even if they are politically
unpopular. Finally, and perhaps most
dramatically, the people have even
consented to the legislature acting outside
the Constitution’s rights and limitations
when the severe needs for “continuity of
government” so require.23
LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
ON CHANGING AN
INITIATED LAW

I

f initiatives proliferate in Maine, particularly on issues viewed as divisive,
legislators will increasingly be invited to
consider subsequent changes. Legislators
may be more or less inclined to do so
depending upon the subject matter or
issues of principle, policy, passion, or
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politics. Some legislators may believe
that initiatives as express acts of direct
democracy are entitled to strict deference
ab initio. Others may so passionately
object to the policy that they eschew any
such notion of deference. Yet others will
occupy positions in between.
So, a two-part threshold question is
what, if any, higher scrutiny or deference
should be applied to an approved initiative, and how is that standard defined and
determined to be met? Again, as the
Constitution does not require a supermajority, such as two-thirds, vote to change
an approved initiative, that is not the
standard.
A practical approach to addressing
this question would be to identify the
types of issues, regardless of the subject
matter, that should be considered in
determining whether straight deference is
outweighed in any instance. Such considerations might include, for example, the
following:
• Circumstances—How long ago
was the measure approved? To
what degree have the circumstances foreseen for regulation
changed?
• Role—To what degree does the
measure interfere with a core
responsibility typically reposed
to the legislature, such as public
safety, spending, taxation, or
education? Does the measure
involve a subject matter with the
type of reaching and complex
consequences that benefit from
the legislature’s deliberative
process?
• Compliance—To what degree
does the measure present on its
face or as applied material legal
questions? Does the measure lack
clarity? Is it under- or over-inclusive? Does it otherwise present
compliance confusion?
63
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• Conflicts—To what degree does
the measure materially conflict
with other Maine laws? Was the
measure crafted from existing
Maine law? Or is it a template
imported from other state(s)
with different demographics
and regulatory schemes?
• Scope—To what degree is the
measure one of broad vs limited
application or scope? To what
degree would a change be as
broad or as narrow?
• Passage—What percentage of
electors voted on the measure?
By what percentage did it
pass? To what degree does
the measure reflect the will of
certain parts of the state more
so than other parts? To what
degree are there legitimate
concerns with the accuracy or
completeness of the information presented to the people?
Thoughtful persons can identify
additional or alternative considerations.
The point here is that when the legislature considers addressing the merits of an
approved initiative, conscientious
lawmaking should be applied regardless
of whether the legislature ends up
standing upon deference or crafting a
response deemed better suited to the
perceived needs of the day. Either way, as
noted in the introduction, legislators will
have tended to both their representational duty to show respect for the
popular will and their leadership responsibility to possibly better steward the
interests of the state.

the Constitution’s distribution of express
and implied delegated powers between
the people and the three branches of
government. It is the doctrine of checks
and balances that distributes power
between those four sovereign actors and
both authorizes and obligates the legislature to judge and moderate the direct
democratic acts of the people. This is
the way that our Constitution, which
decidedly created a representative democracy, checks, balances, and integrates
the people’s important acts of direct
democracy.
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6

The figures in this section are based
upon research conducted with Cleaves
Law Library and the Law and Legislative
Reference Library. The exact tabulation of
“subsequent amendments” is challenging
because a law can be amended directly
by express act and indirectly by changes
to related laws. This article counted only
the direct amendments that the libraries
identified.

7

I.B. 2003, ch. 2 amended by P.L. 2005,
ch. 2. Changes to that formula are both
complicated and consequential as GPA
accounts for about two-thirds of all state
spending in a fiscal year.

8

The rights discussed in this paragraph are
(in order discussed) set forth in Me. Const.
art. I, § 15; art. I, § 2; art. IV, pt. 1, § 1, and
pt. 3, § 18; and art. IV, pt. 1, § 1, and pt. 3,
§ 17. Furthermore, the legislature cannot
interfere with the submission of initiated
measures to the people either by action
or by inaction and cannot enact amendments to a law during the period in which
a competing measure is pending before
the voters (Ferris ex rel. Dorsky v. Gross,
143 Me. 227, 232 [1948]; Op. Me. Att’y
Gen. No. 97-1 at 1997 WL 664660 [1997];
Tinker [1992]).

9

Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1, and §§ 2 and
2-A. The governor also has the related
powers to introduce and veto legislation,
but the governor does not have the power
to enact (Me. Const. art. V, pt. 1, § 9 and
Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, §§ 2 and 2-A).

The author is indebted to Nancy Rabasca,
head librarian at Cleaves Law Library, for her
excellence, patience, and diligence in helping
research this article.

NOTES
1

2

“The initiative has become an increasingly widespread device for addressing a
variety of societal concerns, such as land
use regulations, environmental policy, and
public health issues.” Marshall Tinkle, The
Maine State Constitution, A Reference
Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1992), 91. This article addresses only
initiatives pursuant to Me. Const. art. IV, pt.
3, § 18; it does not analyze referenda (laws
initiated and passed by the legislature and
then subject to people’s approval or veto)
pursuant to Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 17.
National Council of State Legislatures
(NCSL) at https://www.ncsl.org/research/
elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-theinitiative-states.aspx. For more detailed
information on the various states’ different
approaches, see https://www.ncsl.org
/research/elections-and-campaigns
/initiative-and-referendum-processes.
aspx#/.

3

Interestingly enough, the legislature
promptly amended the first popularly
approved measure. P.L. 1913, ch. 221
amended by P.L. 1915, ch. 47, § 2.

4

Tinkle, 1992.

5

Opinion of the Justices, 673 A.2d 693,
695 (Me. 1996) citing, among others
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 487

CONCLUSION

T

(1905). Op. Me. Att’y Gen. No. 05-4 at 2005
WL 4542877 (Me. A.G.); Op. Me. Att’y Gen.
(April 26, 1976) at 1976 Me. AG. Lexis 126.

10 See, for example, Jones v. Maine State
Highway Commission, 238 A.2d 226, 230
(1968), citing Baxter et al. v. Waterville
Sewerage District et al., 79 A.2d 585, 588
(1951).
11 Broad police power is described in Me.
Const. art. V, pt. 1, § 9, and art. IV, pt. 3, §
1. See also, for example, First Nat. Bank of
Boston v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 136
A.2d 699, 708 (1957).
12 Imposing taxes is set forth in Me. Const.
art. I, § 22 and art. IX, § 8, and suspending
taxes in Me. Const. art. IX, § 9. The Maine
Supreme Court has recognized that the
power of taxation is an essential attribute
of sovereignty. See, for example, Town
of Milo v. Milo Water Co., 131 Me. 372,
378-89 (1932).
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13 Support for education is set forth in Me.
Const. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; taxes for schools
in art. IX, § 8(3); and importance of public
education in art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1.
14 Sources for this paragraph are (in order of
appearance) found in Me. Const. art. V, pt.
3, § 4; Opinion of Justices, 370 A.2d 654,
667-68 (Me. 1977) (revenue legislation);
Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1 (broad power
to enact includes budget bills) and Me.
Const. art. IX, § 14 (implying requirement
that budget be balanced in order to avoid
unauthorized debt); Me. Const. art. IV, pt.
3, § 1 (police power clause); and emergency measures are enacted pursuant to
Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 16.
15 See Me. Const. art. IX, § 17 and art. II, § 4.
16 Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18. As an interesting aside, the Law Court has held that
emergency legislation amending a statute
that an initiated measure seeks to repeal
does not constitute a competing measure
(McCaffrey v. Gartley, 377 A.2d 1367 [Me.
1977]). Likewise, the legislature may not
enact amendments to a law during the
period in which a competing measure is
pending before the voters (Op. Me. Att’y
Gen. No. 97-1).

Inability to recall a governor is implied by
exclusion from Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, §
7, art. IV, pt. 1, § 8, and art. IX, § 5. Inability
to recall a senator or representative is
implied by exclusion from Me. Const. art.
IV, pt. 3, § 4; and inability to convene a
legislative session from Me. Const. art.
IV, pt. 3, § 1. See First Nat. Bank of Boston
v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 136 A.2d
at 708 for discussion of police powers,
and Me. Const. art. IX, § 9 for taxation
powers. Other sources from the Maine
Constitution include art. IV, pt. 3, § 16
(emergency measures); art. IV, pt. 2, §
7 (impeachment); art. IV, pt. 3, § 2 (veto
overrides); art. V, pt. 1, § 8, ¶ 3, and § 14
(confirmation procedures and removing
a disabled governor); and art. IX, § 14
(bonds), §20 (mining), § 21 (mandates), §
23 (state parks).
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23 Sources for this paragraph include (in
order discussed) Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3,
§§ 3 and 4; art. IV, pt. 2, § 7; art. IV, pt. 1,
§ 8; and art. IX, § 5; art. V, pt. 1, §§ 14 and
15; art. VI, § 1; and art. IX, § 17.

17 Provision for this legislative process is set
forth in Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 2 and
2A. Permitting the legislature to recall it
beforehand is an implied power under
the presentment clause in Me. Const. art.
IV, pt. 3, § 2 and recognized expressly in
Mason’s Manual of Legislative Procedure,
§753 (3).
18 The six primary ways in which the will
of the people is recognized are (in order
listed in paragraph) found in Me. Const.
preamble; art. X, § 4; art. II, § 1; art. IV, pt.
3, §§ 18 and 17; and art. IX, §14.
19 Me. Const. art, IX, § 1.
20 Me. Const. art. III, §§1 and 2.
21 Note also that the legislature may also use
its lawmaking powers to not fully fund a
measure approved by voters.
22 These constraints are recognized in Me.
Const. art. X, § 4 (constitutional amendment); art. IX, § 14; Opinion of Justices,
191 A.2d 357, 360 (1963) (bond issues);
Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Secretary of
State, 2020 ME 109 (legislative character); Opinion of the Justices, 673 A.2d
693, 697 (Me. 1996) (citing U.S. Const.
art. V); and Opinion of Justices, 370 A.2d
654, 669 (Me. 1977) (suspending laws).
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